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PROTECTING DEPORTABLE ALIENS FROM PHYSICAL
PERSECUTION: SECTION 243(h) OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952
ALIENS deported from the United States may face treatment repugnaut fts
American standards of justice upon arrival at their final destination. Merely
because of political or religious beliefs which are disfavored by the receiving
government, for example, they may be subjected to death, torture, or im-
prisonment. Some of these aliens are deported because they have enaged in suli-
versive or criminal activities.' The large majority, however, are relatively
harmless individuals whose only offense has been failure to comply, perhaps
inadvertently, with technical immigration regulations. - In view of the rvii yt
with which the immigration acts are often applied, explicit Ftatutory pro-
tection for both classes of aliens from such drastic consequences is essential.
Congress first attempted to deal with this problem in the Internal Security
Act of 1950.' Section 23 of that Act4 offered to individuals who had been
1. Deportation for such activities is now provided for by tVie Immigrati.a aid Natiu:i-
ality Act of 1952 ("The McCarran Act"), Pub. L No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sc's. £ 241 (4 4,
(6)-(7), (11)-(18) (June 27, 1952). Of the 40.212 aliens deported frcni the United
States in the period 1949-51, 3,261 were deported becau.e of criminal or subvwr-i,2
activities. REP. OF PRESIDENT's COiMi. ON I ,MIGR T-:.c AND NXrn. LIZA.wTI Wt1
(1952). It seems likely that this number will increase in the future bzau,! of th':
broader provisions for deportation on political grounds contained in the McCarraq Act.
For a brief history of the increasing use of undesirable political activity as a basis for
deportation, see Note, The Attorney-Gencral and Atiens: Unlimited Discretion and the
Right to Fair Treatment, 60 Y.LE L.J. 152 (1951). For extensive discussion #f current
problems pertaining to immigration and naturalization, see Dcrelopments ill the Lez,-
Immigration and Nlaturalization, 66 H.sv. L. REv. 643 (1953).
2. Of the 40,212 aliens deported from the United States in the period 1949-51, 29,122
were charged with violation of immigration regulations pertaining to entry and statu-.
In 1951, 3,289 of 13,544 aliens deported were charged with remaining in the country longe,2r
than authorized. An additional 5,322 were deported becaue they had entered vithout
proper documents, without inspection, or by false statements. REP. 4-F
Co11. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATUmAuzATION 1% (1952). Of this second grup's
plight it has been said: "Aany of the immigration requirements are highly technical....
In many. . . cases the alien himself has nothing to do with the actual compliance with
the technicalities of the law. A failure to observe these or a multitude of other technical
requirements makes the alien's entry irregular and therefore under present law renders
him subject to expulsion." Id. at 196-7.
It is estimated that there are three to five million aliens illegally in the United States.
98 CoNG. REc. 5172 (1952). For the current legislative provisions setting up the techni-
calities which may trip up the unwary alien, see Pub. L No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. §
241(2), (5), (9) (June 27, 1952).
3. 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. 1951).
4. Section 23 amended § 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917. 39 STAT. 874 (1917),
28 U.S.C. § 156 (1946). Both sections dealt generally with the methods to be employvL1
in determining the country to which an undesirable alien was to be deportcd.
For a statement of the motives which prompted the passage of the 19. J lgi~att, ii
see Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605, 6U6 (N.D. Cal. 1952), and sources therein otd.
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classified as deportable aliens the right to have deportation suspended if they
faced physical persecution in the country designated to receive them.5 The
section provided that:
"No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this chapter
to any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such
alien would be subjected to physical persecution."
In the recently enacted Immigration and Nationality Act of 19520 the
provisions of Section 23 have been been significantly altered. Section 243(h)
of the new Act states:
"The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of
any alien within the United States to any country in which in his
opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for
such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason."'
The new law differs from the old in two important respects. First, under
the new wording only an opinion, rather than a finding of fact, is required
5. The procedures employed in the 1950 Act to determine the country to which a
deportable alien was to be sent are outlined in 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 156
(Supp. 1951).
Under current law the Attorney General must deport an alien to the country of his
choice if tfiat country is willing to accept him. Pub. L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 243 (a) (June 27, 1952). The alien is allowed to make only one such designation, how-
ever, and the Attorney General may refuse to deport to the designated country if "in his
discretion, [he] concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States." Ibid. In the event that the alien fails to make a designa-
tion (see.United States ex rel. Nereo Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 611 (1952)),
or the country which he designates refuses to accept him (see United States ex rd.
Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613 (1952)), the Attorney General may deport to
practically any country that he desires. Ibid.
6. Pub. L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1952).
7. As originally phrased in S. 2550 and H.R. 5678 the provision read: "No alien
shall be deported under any provisions of this act to any country in which the Attorney
General in his discretion finds that such alien would be subject to physical persecution,"
The congressional committees reporting out these bills stated: "The bill continues the
provision in existing law to the effect that no alien shall be deported to any country in
which the Attorney General finds that he would be subjected to physical persecution."
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; SEN. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
"The change in the language of the provision as it now appears in the Immigration
and Nationality Act ... was motivated by a desire to clarify the provision to make it
perfectly clear that a determination of whether or not the deportation of an alien should
be withheld in such cases is solely within the discretion of the Attorney General."
Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from Senator Pat McCarran (D. Nev.), dated
Jan. 17, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
For criticism of the McCarran Act's numerous grants of discretionary authority to
the Attorney General, see REP. OF PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALl-
ZATiON xv, 16-19 (1952); see also President Truman's message to Congress accompany-
ing his veto of the McCarran Act, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1952, p. 4, col. 7; and Com-
munication to'YALE LAW JoL-RNAL from Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D. Minn),
dated Jan. 23, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
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of the Attorney Generals on the question of physical persecution. Second.
even when it is evident that an alien if deported would face piyt ical persecu-
tion. suspension appears entirely discretionary. The Attorney General i..
"authorized" but not required to withhold deportation."
The language of the 1950 Act merely prohibited deportation where the
Attorney General found that an alien zeould be persecuted; hut the courts
required the Attorney General to make a finding that the alien would not be
persecuted. 10 To reach such a finding, a hearing in accordance with the require-
ments of procedural due process had to be conducted." In three cases vwhere
aliens introduced evidence of probable physical persecution, district court-
refused to allow the Attorney General simply to dismiss the claims obn the
ground that they were unconvincing or unsupported. 12 On the facts trfore
them, at least, the courts seemed to require the Immigration authorities to
introduce some affirmative evidence that the aliens would not he persecuted
before they would permit deportation. And in one of the cases, the court
refused to accept a finding against the alien in which the sole evidence adverse
to his claim was a written assertion-made by the receiving country's am-
bassador-that the alien would not be subject to persecution.n On the other
hand, only in United States ex rel. Doln= v. Shauzghnessy 24 did a district
8. The original procedures relating to the apprmension and rcmovl of dep rtablv
aliens are conducted by the Immigration ard Naturalization Service of the Department
of Justice. Appeals from decisions of the Service are decided by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals. The Board functions independently of the Service and serves to come e: tcnt
as an agent of the Attorney General in deportation matters. The Attorney General ex-
ercises final authority, however. Pub. L. No. 414, -2d Ccng., 2d Secs. § 103(2) (June 27,
1952). He has been granted broad authority to delegate his powers under the statute.
Ibid. For a history of the development of the adminstration of the immigratin la,s,
see REP. oF PREsmzxv's CoMM. oN IuxGr-,,TioN .%ND N.wTTLiZATioN 127-31 (l1952s.
(1952).
9. Under the 1950 Act, "[C]ongress gave a mandatory inflectikn to its words. It
said that 'No alien shall be deported' .. . ." Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. t,05, 07 (N.D.
Cal. 1952). And 62 STAT. 1206 (1948), 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (Supp. 1951) gave the Attorney
General discretionary power to grant suspension of deportation in cases of economic
hardship. In construing the power granted under § 155(c), the Second Circuit Eaid:
"[T]he statute does not say that the Attorney General must suspend dcpurtatikn; it only
says that he 'may'." United States cx rcl. Weddeke v. Watkins, l66 F2d 3, 9, 373 (24
Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1943).
10. Section 23 was first construed in this mamer in United Statks cx rcl. Harisiadeb
v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), aftd, 342 U.S. 510 (1951).
11. "In the face of this requirement of a finding, these relators cannot Lu depriveJ
of a hearing and a reasoned determination." United States cx rel. Chen Ping Zee v.
Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also United States ex re!.
Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp.
603 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (injunction against deportation), firther procccdings, id. at 005
(release ordered).
12. See United States cx ieL Chen Ping Zee v. Shauglne-sy, sutra nole 11; UnitJ
States er tel Watts v. Shaughnessy, supra note 11; Park v. Barber, supra nwte 11.
13. Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
14. 107 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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court explicitly read the statute as not requiring the Attorney General to
present any adverse evidence; it allowed him to make his finding purely
from a reasonable evaluation of the evidence presented by the alien.
The judicial protection thus afforded by a majority of courts under the
1950 Act may be eliminated by the new law. Since only an "opinion" rather
than a "finding" is specified, the courts may no longer require a formal hear-
ing on the alien's claim of physical persecution. 16 And even if they should
conclude that a hearing is essential, it seems likely that the Attorney General
will have virtually a free hand in the manner in which he uses such a hearing
to formulate an opinion. Despite the specific requirement of a finding tinder
the old Section 23, the Attorney General was permitted in Dolenv to make
a determination that an alien would not be persecuted merely by weighing the
testimony of the claimant himself and of two "expert" witnesses called by the
claimant. It seems probable that under the looser wording of the new law
few courts would require the Attorney General to do more than similarly
hear and evaluate evidence offered by the alien.
By possibly eliminating a full hearing on the issue of physical persecution
and by granting the Attorney General a broad discretion to deport in any
event, Section 243(h) may exceed the limits of constitutionality. At present,
ordinary deportation proceedings against a resident alien must be carried out
in accordance with procedural due process.10 Denial of such safeguards as a
15. Under the provisions of 62 STAT. 1206 (1948), 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (Supp. 1951),
involving the discretionary power of the Attorney General to suspend deportation in
cases of economic hardship, some courts have held that a hearing in accordance with
procedural due process is required. United States cx rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 16 F.2d
369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948); Kavadias v. Cross, 82 F. Supp. 716
(N.D. Ind. 1948). But § 155(c) called for a "finding" rather than an "opinion" when these
cases were decided. And cf. United States ex rel. Zabadlija v. Garfinkel, 77 F. Supp. 751
(W.D. Penn. 1948) (Immigration Board does not have to suspend deportation proceedings
and grant a hearing on alien's contentions of economic hardship). In addition, the Wed-
deke and Kavadias cases seem to have been based on the fact that the Attorney General's
regulations had provided for a quasi-judicial procedure to determine eligibilty for sus-
pension under § 155(c). 8 CODE FED. REas. § 150.6 (1949).
Under a related section of the Immigration Laws prior to 1952, before an alien could
be deported as a public charge a "finding" had to be made by the Attorney General.
The 1952 law changes this requirement of a finding to an opinion. For a criticism of this
action, see REP. OF PRFSDEN-fS CoMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 20
(1952).
16. "It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law." Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 21
U.S.L. WEEK 4242, 4243 (U.S. March 16, 1952). See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33 (1949) ; Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1902); United States ex
rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (suspension proceedings).
The due process protection which applies to deportation proceedings, however, may be of a
more restricted nature than that which applies to ordinary criminal proceedings. Zakonaite v.
Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); United States v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D, Penn,
1950) (strict adherence to judicial procedure not required in a hearing in deportation
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fair hearing and a right to have a decision based solely upLn that hearing
constitutes an improper deprivation of "life, liberty, or property" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.1 7 Under current world conditions, rezolu-
tion of the question of whether or not an alien will be persecuted upon arrival
at his ultimate destination certainly has as serious an effect on his life or liberty
as does the initial decision to deport him. Hence, the Fifth Amendment would
seem to require both that such a determination be accompanied by at least
equal procedural safeguards and that suspension of depurtation be mandatory
where a hearing indicates that the alien's claim is valid.18
proceedings); Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (requirements of due
process satisfied if deportation order is based on some evidence). Brt cf. Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944) (order of deportation must be based on smebstaniaa! evidence).
Despite the severity of the penalty, the courts have unanimously held that deporta-
tion matters are entirely civil in nature. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 454 (1952)
("Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held ti te punishment.
No jury sits. No judicial review is granted by the Constitution.").
The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 242, provides for full hearings on the
question of deportabilit. The law states that administrative regulations promulgated
under § 242 must include provisions giving the alien the right to counsel of his own
choosing; a reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against him, to present evidence
on his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government. Pub.
L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 242 (June 27, 1952). This hearing, however, is confined
to questions of determination of dcportabilily.
17. "A full and fair hearing on the charges which threaten his deportation ... is
indispensable to the lawvful deportation of an alien .... An alien, as well as a citizen,
is protected by the prohibition of deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process and the equal protection of the law." Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 748
(Sth Cir. 1915). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1944) ; Hays v. Hatges,
94 F2d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Ex Parte Kurth, 28 F. Supp. 258, 260 (S.D. Cal. 1939)
United States ex reL. v. Van De Mark, 3 F. Supp. 101, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
The right to a fair hearing includes the right "that the decision shall be governed
by and based upon the evidence at the hearing, and that only." Whitfield v. Hang,:s
222 Fed. 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1915). See also Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F.2d 80, 83 (8th Cir.
1924).
Numerous decisions have outlined the prerequisites for a fair hearing. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Zubrick, 45 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1930) (right to e.xamine available witnesses) ;
Ex Parte Keisukisita, 215 Fed. 173 (N.D. Cal. 1914) (opportunity for alin to controvert
adverse evidence) ; Ex Parte Kurth, 28 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (right to counsel).
The Supreme Court has frequently pointed to the severe consequences of ordinary
deportation. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. -276 (1922) (deportation "may result...
in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living"). See also,
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1943); see Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 689, 732-44 (1893) (dissent). And see, KoNvrrLz, ALIEN AND AsTInC Iz;
AimEac x LAw c. 2 (1946); McGovney, Deportation of Aliens, 18 Iowa L Rm. 187, 1 8
(1932).
18. The statement of one district court judge may be interpreted as e.xtending the
full protection of due process to suspension proceedings when they involve a possible
deprivation of life or liberty. "An alien who avails himself of a provision of law con-
cerning a matter so vital that his very life and liberty may depend upon its just applica-
tion is entitled to the thorough and surrounding protection of the Fifth Amendment."
United States ex rel. Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Regardless of possible constitutional defects, the discretionary nature of
the power granted the Attorney General under the new law seems likely to
eliminate effective judicial review.19 Some courts dealing with actions of the
Attorney General under similar statutory grants of discretionary authority
have indicated that no review is available.20 Others have held that review
will be granted only when there has been a serious abuse of discretion or a
failure to exercise discretion at all.21
A fair appraisal of the impact of persecution on deported aliens suggests
the need for at least the minimum procedural safeguards implicit in the "find-
ing" required by the 1950 Act. Under that Act a hearing on the persecution
question was held only after an alien was first found to be deportable. Since
most deportation cases do not involve any issue of physical persecution, such
a procedure appears proper. Once the issue is raised, however, the Govern-
ment should not be permitted to dismiss reasonable claims summarily. Hence,
where the alien introduces valid evidence to support his contentions, an ad-
verse decision by the Attorney General should be permitted only where the
Government introduces adequate rebutting evidence. And the entire procedure
should be open to judicial review. Such protection for the alien would not
19. See Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
(D. Minn.), dated Jan. 23, 1952, in Yale Law Library. See also President Truman's
Message to Congress, accompanying his veto of the McCarran Act, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1952, p. 4, col. 7.
20. See, e.g., Sleddens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1949) (suspension of
deportation is a matter of discretion which the court is without power to review);
United States ex rel. Walther v. District Director, 175 F2d 693 (2d Cir. 1949) (the word
"may" when used in a statute relating to suspension of deportation confers discretionary
unreviewable power upon the Attorney General); United States e.v rel. Zabadlija v.
Garfinkel, 77 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Penn. 1948) (when a statute has corferred discre-
tionary power on an executive department, the court cannot interfere with this exercise
of discretion).
21. Section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 amended former provisions inl
regard to the granting of bail to aliens pending determination of deportability by insert-
ing "in the discretion of the Attorney General." 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 156
(Supp. 1951). In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) the Court said, "It [the
Attorney General's discretion upon the granting of bail] can only be overridden where it
is clearly shown that it 'was without a reasonable foundation.' "
For instances of limited judicial review over the Attorney General's discretionary
power to suspend deportation in cases of economic hardship, see Mastrapasqua v. Shaugh.
nessy, 180 F2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180
F.2d 489, 490 (2d Cir. 1950) ; U.S. ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) ; Kavadias v. Cross, 82 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1948),
rev'd on other grounds, 177 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1949). See also Note, 60 YALE L.J. 152
(1951).
For instances of limited judicial review over discretionary administrative actions in
regard to voluntary departure of deportable aliens under 54 STAr. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C.
§ 155(c) (1946), see United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245 (2d Cir,




impose too great a duty on the Immigration Service. As suggested by one
district court under the 1950 Act, the informational resources of the State
and Justice Departments could be properly utilized by the Immigration officers
to promote a fair decision.22 Once a determination is made that an alien %ll
be persecuted in a given country, suspension of deportation to that country
should be mandatory.2
For the past year, the United States has vigorously fought against a
Korean truce which would require that North Korean and Chinese communist
prisoners of war be sent back to "slavery [or] almost certain death. ... "21
Arguing both on the basis of the humanitarian goals of the United Nations
Charter and the Geneva Convention of 1949, this Government takes the posi-
tion that it cannot properly return these individuals involuntarily to physical
persecution. 5 But if, under international agreements dealing with general
principles of humanitarianism, the United States feels obliged to refuse to send
prisoners of war back to such treatment, certainly the more specific protection
afforded to aliens by the Bill of Rights should compel the Government to
refrain from arbitrarily sending relatively harmless civiian aliens to a similar
fate.20 Frequent disregard by the Attorney General of aliens' claims in past
22. See Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605. 607, (N.D. Cal. 1952).
Moreover, such an inquiry does not involve an evaluation of complex scientific or
economic data like that presented in many administrative determinations. A just and
reasonable decision could therefore be quickly reached once an adequate investigation has
been made.
23. The continued presence of the alien within the country as a result of such mandatry
suspension would not weaken the nation's security. Under present law, for a p2riod of
six months subsequent to a final order of deportation "the alien may be detained, (or] re-
leased on bond in an amount and containing such conditions as the Attorney General
may prescribe ... ." Pub. L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1952). In addition,
if after six months, "deportation has not been practicable, advisable, or possible, or de-
parture of the alien from the United States under the order of deportation has not ben
effected," the alien becomes subject to further supervision. Id. at § 242(c). The regula-
tions for such supervision may include provision for periodic reports to be made by the
alien to an immigration official; submission, if necessary, to mental and/or physical e-
aminations; and the giving of such information under oath which the Attorney General
"may deem fit and proper." Moreove&, the alien must "conform to such reasonable vwritten
restrictions on his conduct or activities as are prescribed by the Attorney General in his
case." Refusal to comply with any of the above requirements may result in conviction
of a felony. Ibid.
24. President Harry S. Truman, quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1952, p. 1, col. 4.
See also Charmatz & Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of Tlrar and the 19-19 Gcn ea
Convention, 62 YALE LJ. 391, 392 (1953) ("Past treatment given repatriated nationals
of communist countries convinced the leaders of the Western powers that Chinese and
North Korean prisoners on their return would be exposed to deprivation of human
rights.").
25. For a full discussion of the problems involved in forcible repatriation of prisoners
of ar, see Charmatz & Wit, supra note 24, passim.
26. The full protection of the Bill of Rights applies to aliens and citizens alike. Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Kv.-od: Jan
Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) ; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 2 (1IM);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1S).
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persecution cases 27 indicates the extreme danger inherent in the complete
lack of safeguards now available to an individual for whom deportation may
mean persecution. Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 should be redrafted so as to affirm "our historic tradition of affording
asylum to the persecuted.1
2 8
27. The courts have criticized the Immigration authorities' actions tinder § 23 for
being contrary to the proven facts and to a fair evaluation of the evidence presented (in the
suspension hearings). United States ex rel. Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613, 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). The Immigration Service has also been rebuked for lightly dismissing
testimony as to physical persecution. United States ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy,
107 F. Supp. 607, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
28. See United States ex rel. Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.NY.
1952) ("[Section 23 of the 1950 Act] is, by strong analogy, consonant with our historic
tradition of affording asylum to the persecuted, a tradition which reaches back beyond
the birth of the Fifth Amendment itself.").
Some legislators have suggested that not only should statutory protection equivalent to
that of the 1950 law be provided, but that it should be extended beyond mere physical
persecution. In S. 2842 (1952) (a bill offered in opposition to the McCarran bill and subse-
quently rejected) the words "or persecution of any kind because of race, religion, or
political opinions" were added to the pertinent provision. Communications to YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D. Minn.), dated Jan. 23, 1953, and
Senator Herbert H. Lehman (D. N.Y.), dated Mar. 17, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
The 83d Congress will consider at least two bills directed towards revision of the
McCarren Act. Representative Barrett of Pennsylvania has announced his intention to
submit a bill which would entirely repeal the legislation. Representative Javits of
New York has presented a bill calling for a rewriting of the law. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
Jan. 4, 1953, p. 5, col. 3. In addition, President Eisenhower has indicated his desire to see
a change in the law as it now stands. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1953, p. 1, col. 5.
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